Debt Derisking
Jannic Cutura, Gianpaolo Parise, Andreas Schrimpf
Management Science · 2025 · Volume 71 · Issue 1
Abstract
We examine how corporate bond fund managers manipulate portfolio risk in response to incentives. We find that liquidity risk concerns drive the allocation decisions of underperforming funds, whereas tournament incentives are of secondary importance. This leads laggard fund managers to trade off yield for liquidity while holding the exposure to other sources of risk constant. The documented derisking is stronger for managers with shorter tenure and is reinforced by a more concave flow to performance sensitivity and by periods of market stress. Derisking meaningfully supports ex post laggard fund returns. Flexible net asset values (swing pricing) may, however, reduce derisking incentives and create moral hazard. This paper was accepted by Agostino Capponi, finance. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03406 .
Keywords
mutual funds, incentives, derisking, fragility, bond liquidity, financial institutions, investment, finance, portfolio, financial institutions, markets
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