Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Drawdown Analyses
Douglas W. Owens, Gregory S. Parnell, Robert L. Bivins
Operations Research · 1996 · Volume 44 · Issue 3
Abstract
This study investigated the feasibility and impacts of various U.S. and USSR time-phased strategic force structure reduction alternatives (commonly referred to as drawdowns ) under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The study resulted from the Soviet Union's request for a U.S. position on the proposed Soviet drawdown limits. Treaty drawdown limits are time-phased numerical ceilings specified in the treaty, e.g., total weapons must be less than or equal to 8000 by January 1, 1996 and 6000 by January 1, 1998. Various modernized START force structures were evaluated under four drawdown limit alternatives. Two linear programming models (U.S. and USSR) were developed to rapidly assess each drawdown limit alternative. The models determined drawdown feasibility and identified the systems to dismantle each year to maximize force capability. For the U.S., the preferred drawdown limit alternatives were independent of the force structures considered, primarily because constraints on U.S. destruction rates drove the drawdown. For the USSR, significant differences occurred between each drawdown limit alternative, especially concerning multiple warhead systems like the SS-18. The results of this study were used to determine the U.S. START negotiation positions and assess the final START agreement.
Keywords
arms control, linear programming analysis of treaty limit provisions, linear programming, nuclear arms control agreement
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