The Effect of the Strictness of Consultation Requirements on Fraud Consultation
Gold, Anna, Knechel, W. Robert, Wallage, Philip
The Accounting Review · 2012 · Volume 87 · Issue 3
Abstract
We investigate how the strictness of a requirement to consult on potential client fraud affects auditors' propensity to consult with firm experts. We consider two specific forms of guidance about fraud consultations: (1) strict, i.e., mandatory and binding; and (2) lenient, i.e., advisory and non-binding. We predict that a strict consultation requirement will lead to greater propensity to consult, particularly under certain client- and engagement-related conditions. Results from two experiments with 163 Dutch audit managers and partners demonstrate that consultation propensity is higher under a strict consultation requirement, but only when underlying fraud risk is high. The strictness effect is also greater under tight versus relaxed time pressure. Further, a strict standard increases auditors' perceived probability that a fraud indicator exists. Overall, we demonstrate that the formulation of a standard can have the desired effect on the judgments of auditors while also creating unexpected incentives that may influence auditor judgments. Data Availability:The data used in this study are available upon request from the authors.
Keywords
auditing standards, consultation requirement, consultation propensity, deadline pressure, fraud, fraud risk
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