Multinational Tax Incentives and Offshored U.S. Jobs
The Accounting Review · 2018 · Volume 93 · Issue 5
Abstract
This paper examines if, when, and to what extent multinational tax incentives incrementally explain where firms move offshored U.S. jobs. Using jobs data from a Department of Labor program called Trade Adjustment Assistance, I find a significant association between tax incentives and both the likelihood that a foreign country hosts offshored U.S. jobs and the number of U.S. jobs it hosts. This association is stronger when managers have discretion to coordinate cross-border transactions internally and when they do not face political costs imposed by labor unions. Following instances of offshoring, I find some evidence that offshoring firms have lower effective tax rates, but these reductions are concentrated within larger layoffs in which jobs are sent to low-tax countries. These findings are relevant to understanding the real effects and welfare consequences of incentives created by current U.S. tax policy. JEL Classifications:F23; H26; J63; L14.
Keywords
offshoring, multinational tax incentives, boundary of the firm
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