Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time
Maria Bigoni, Marco Casari, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Giancarlo Spagnolo
Econometrica · 2015 · Volume 83 · Issue 2
Abstract
We study social dilemmas in (quasi-) continuous-time experiments, comparing games with different durations and termination rules. We discover a stark qualitative contrast in behavior in continuous time as compared to previously studied behavior in discrete-time games: cooperation is easier to achieve and sustain with deterministic horizons than with stochastic ones, and end-game effects emerge, but subjects postpone them with experience. Analysis of individual strategies provides a basis for a simple reinforcement learning model that proves to be consistent with this evidence. An additional treatment lends further support to this explanation.
Keywords
Prisoner's dilemma, experiment, folk theorem, backward induction
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