Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games

Johannes Hörner, Satoru Takahashi, Nicolas Vieille

Econometrica · 2015 · Volume 83 · Issue 5

Abstract

This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for dynamic Bayesian games as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may depend on actions, types may be correlated, and values may be interdependent. The focus is on equilibria in which players report truthfully. The characterization generalizes that for repeated games, reducing the analysis to static Bayesian games with transfers. With independent private values, the restriction to truthful equilibria is without loss, except for the punishment level: if players withhold their information during punishment-like phases, a folk theorem obtains.

Keywords

Bayesian games, repeated games, folk theorem

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