On the Structure of Informationally Robust Optimal Mechanisms
Econometrica · 2024 · Volume 92 · Issue 5
Abstract
We study the design of optimal mechanisms when the designer is uncertain both about the form of information held by the agents and also about which equilibrium will be played. Theguaranteeof a mechanism is its worst performance across all information structures and equilibria. Thepotentialof an information structure is its best performance across all mechanisms and equilibria. We formulate a pair of linear programs, one of which is a lower bound on the maximum guarantee across all mechanisms, and the other of which is an upper bound on the minimum potential across all information structures. In applications to public expenditure, bilateral trade, and optimal auctions, we use the bounding programs to characterize guarantee-maximizing mechanisms and potential-minimizing information structures and show that the max guarantee is equal to the min potential.
Keywords
Mechanism design, information design, public expenditure, optimal auctions, max-min, Bayes correlated equilibrium, robustness
Enable JavaScript for citation tools and additional paper interactions.