Understanding When and Why Cover-Ups Are Punished Less Severely

Abstract

Cover-ups of unethical actions are undesirable and often costly. However, existing theory is unclear on when and why some cover-ups are punished less severely by in-group third parties compared to out-group third parties. Drawing on theories of attribution and social identity, we theorize that the punishment of cover-ups by in- and out-group third parties depends on the type of cover-up: specifically, whether individuals conceal their own unethical transgressions (personal cover-ups) or the unethical transgressions of another individual (relational cover-ups). By highlighting this distinction, we hypothesize and find across three studies that in-group third parties punish relational—but not personal—cover-ups less severely than out-group third parties. Moreover, we theorize and find support for the mediating role of perceptions of group loyalty. Our theory and results reveal the ways in which different forms of cover-ups can escape severe punishment, and offer important theoretical contributions for research on unethical behavior, social identity, and loyalty.