The Art of Blending Stakeholders: “Bootlegger and Baptist” Coalitions in Corporate Constituency-Building

Abstract

Constituency-building is an important corporate political strategy that expands the scope of conflict by mobilizing stakeholders to pressure policymakers. Although prior studies of constituency-building have highlighted how enlisting stakeholders in political battles creates unique opportunities and risks, what has been overlooked is the importance of firms assembling “strange bedfellows” of economically and morally motivated constituents, sometimes called “bootlegger-and-Baptist” coalitions. Drawing on theories developed in research on regulatory economics, political processes, social movements, and corporate political strategy, we advance a theoretical framework to examine the trade-offs of firms creating blended coalitions consisting of parties who each have distinct economic and moral motives as opposed to uniform coalitions. We argue that blended coalitions often generate greater benefits by increasing policymakers’ support. However, we highlight higher costs at each of four key stages in blending coalitions—searching for partners, coordinating with partners, mobilizing partners, and monitoring partners—and discuss mitigation strategies. We further develop theory on how to implement blended coalitions, including formulating messages for constituents and choosing policymakers to target. We develop propositions to advance theory development on constituency-building, linked to stakeholder mobilization and social movement approaches. We offer wide-ranging real-world examples to provide guidance for empirical research.