Drew Fudenberg
32 catalog papers. Identity-linked publications and additional name matches are distinguished below.
ORCID: 0000-0002-6747-0125
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Publications
- Selective-Memory Equilibrium — Journal of Political Economy 2024
- Measuring the Completeness of Economic Models — Journal of Political Economy 2022
- Justified Communication Equilibrium — American Economic Review 2021
- Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies — The Review of Economic Studies 2021
- Limit Points of Endogenous Misspecified Learning — Econometrica 2021
- Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship — American Economic Review 2019
- Predicting and Understanding Initial Play — American Economic Review 2019
- Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games — Econometrica 2018 (name-matched, not ORCID-linked)
- Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices — American Economic Review 2018
- Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility — Econometrica 2015
- Dynamic Logit With Choice Aversion — Econometrica 2015
- Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations* — The Quarterly Journal of Economics 2012
- Timing and Self-Control — Econometrica 2012
- Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World — American Economic Review 2012
- Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown — Econometrica 2010
- Repeated Games with Frequent Signals — The Quarterly Journal of Economics 2009
- A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control — American Economic Review 2006
- Superstition and Rational Learning — American Economic Review 2006
- Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? — The Quarterly Journal of Economics 2003
- Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games — The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1997
- Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning — The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1995
- A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents — Journal of Political Economy 1995
- Rules of Thumb for Social Learning — Journal of Political Economy 1993
- Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed — The Review of Economic Studies 1992
- Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction — Journal of Political Economy 1991
- Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players — The Review of Economic Studies 1990
- Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium — Journal of Political Economy 1989
- Erratum — The Review of Economic Studies 1988
- Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents — The Review of Economic Studies 1987
- Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities — The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1987
- Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology — The Review of Economic Studies 1985
- Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information — The Review of Economic Studies 1983