Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents
Drew Fudenberg, David M. Kreps
The Review of Economic Studies · 1987 · Volume 54 · Issue 4
Abstract
Imagine that one player, the “incumbent” competes with several “entrants”. Each entrant competes only with the incumbent, but observes play in all contests. Previous work shows that, as more and more entrants are added, the incumbent's reputation may dominate play of the game, if the entrants are faced in sequence . We identify conditions under which similar results obtain when the entrants are faced simultaneously , and we find specifications in which adding more simultaneous entrants has a dramatically different effect. We also show that, with either sequential or simultaneous play, incumbents need not prefer the situation in which their reputations can and do dominate play to the “informationally isolated” case in which each entrant observes only play in its own contest.
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