The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making
B. Douglas Bernheim, Antonio Rangel, Luis Rayo
Econometrica · 2006 · Volume 74 · Issue 5
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00701.x
Abstract
We examine legislative policy making in institutions with two empirically relevant features: agenda setting occurs in real time and the default policy evolves. We demonstrate that these institutions select Condorcet winners when they exist, provided a sufficient number of individuals have opportunities to make proposals. In policy spaces with either pork barrel or pure redistributional politics (where a Condorcet winner does not exist), the last proposer is effectively a dictator or near-dictator under relatively weak conditions.
Keywords
Agenda setting, legislative bargaining, majority rule, dictator, pork barrel politics, distributive politics
Enable JavaScript for citation tools and additional paper interactions.