Efficient Auction Mechanisms for Supply Chain Procurement
Rachel R. Chen, Robin O. Roundy, Rachel Q. Zhang, Ganesh Janakiraman
Management Science · 2005 · Volume 51 · Issue 3
Abstract
We consider multiunit Vickrey auctions for procurement in supply chain settings. This is the first paper that incorporates transportation costs into auctions in a complex supply network. We first introduce an auction mechanism that makes simultaneous production and transportation decisions so that the total supply chain cost is minimized and induces truth telling from the suppliers. Numerical study shows that considerable supply chain cost savings can be achieved if production and transportation costs are considered simultaneously. However, the buyer's payments in such auctions can be high. We then develop a new Vickrey-type auction that incorporates the buyer's reservation price function into quantity allocation and payment decision. As a result, the buyer has some control over his payments at the expense of introducing uncertainty in the quantity acquired in the auction.
Keywords
mechanism design, VCG auctions, supply chain procurement
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