Not Just Hearsay and Rumor: How Managers (Actually) Perceive the Credibility of Secondhand Accounts of Employee Voice

Abstract

Employees may raise concerns based on what they hear from others, yet conventional wisdom suggests that managers should be skeptical of these “secondhand accounts” of prohibitive voice. Drawing on the heuristic-systematic model of persuasion, we argue that managers’ beliefs about how they should evaluate secondhand versus firsthand accounts diverge from their actual judgments when encountering either type of prohibitive voice. We report qualitative and quantitative data on managerial lay theories, demonstrating that secondhand accounts are seen as less credible and therefore less likely to require managerial action than firsthand accounts. However, using archival data of over two million instances of employees speaking up through companies’ internal reporting systems, we show that manager behaviors are inconsistent with lay theories—managers are more likely to substantiate secondhand than firsthand accounts. Then, through four experimental studies, we (1) illustrate that despite lay theories that secondhand accounts should be discounted, managers are more likely to find credible and take action on voice from secondhand sources compared to firsthand sources; and (2) provide evidence of mechanisms underlying these effects. In highlighting this disconnect between manager lay beliefs and their actions, we suggest important considerations for voice researchers and practical implications for managers.