Philip J. Reny

15 catalog papers. Identity-linked publications and additional name matches are distinguished below.

ORCID: 0000-0002-8903-8675

Department of Economics, University of Chicago

Publications

Equilibrium Existence in First-Price Auctions With Private Values — Econometrica 2026
Corrigendum to “On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games” — Econometrica 2022
Efficient Matching in the School Choice Problem — American Economic Review 2022
Perfect Conditionalε-Equilibria of Multi-Stage Games With Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions — Econometrica 2020
Assignment Problems — Journal of Political Economy 2017
Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems — Econometrica 2017
How to Count Citations If You Must — American Economic Review 2016
A Characterization of Rationalizable Consumer Behavior — Econometrica 2015
On the Existence of Monotone Pure-Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games — Econometrica 2011
Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium — Econometrica 2006
An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction — The Review of Economic Studies 2005
On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions — Econometrica 2004
An Efficient Auction — Econometrica 2002
On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games — Econometrica 1999
On the Failure of the Linkage Principle in Multi-unit Auctions — Econometrica 1999