The Process of Negotiating: Strategy and Timing as Predictors of Outcomes

Abstract

Using a simulated employment contract negotiation, this research tested for differences in the use of cuing and responding strategies across four types of outcomes (stalemate, win–lose, suboptimum, and optimum), over time, and across time and outcomes. The use of five strategies varied over time, portraying the negotiating process as one of decreasing flexibility. Results also showed that distributive outcomes were characterized by high levels of positional information exchange whereas integrative agreements were characterized by high levels of priority-information exchange. It was possible to further differentiate two integrative outcomes (suboptimum and optimum) in terms of how two strategies were used over time: optimum outcomes were associated with a rapid decrease in positional arguing and a slight increase in restructuring, whereas suboptimum outcomes showed the reverse pattern. Neither the frequency with which strategies were used nor their timing was able to differentiate impasse from win–lose outcomes.